ISC's 2021 Accomplishments

2021 was, sadly, a lot like 2020 for a lot of people: a year of private disappointments and losses for many of us as individuals. It was, however, an extremely successful year for ISC.

We completed work on major new stable versions of BIND 9, Kea DHCP, and Stork: BIND 9.18, Kea 2.0, and Stork 1.0. We had some rough patches this year with BIND 9.16, which suffered because an extensive refactoring project was simply not quite finished when we created the branch. Thankfully we have successfully completed that now, and its successor, BIND 9.18, is looking very good. The Kea user base is growing and both Kea and Stork are maturing. We continue to balance long-term ambitious changes with smaller bug fixes and new features. All of our projects maintained a fast cadence of mostly monthly releases, while improving their QA processes.

We made continued progress in updating and adding F-Root nodes. We also increased participation and leadership from ISC in policy discussions about Root Server Operator (RSO) governance, with the active engagement of ISC’s new general counsel, Rob Carolina.

It is always reassuring to see that ISC can still attract talented people who are excited to work on open source. We added new staff on the BIND and DHCP development teams, and new management and new staff for our support team.

Finally, ISC’s financial picture is very solid right now. We will probably always be anxious about our financial security, given that we are trying to fund the development of free software, but we are starting 2022 in a good place. We ended 2021 with nearly 150 support subscribers - over 90% of them renewals from 2020 - with new customers more than making up for the few we lost. More of our customers are subscribing for both BIND and Kea support, and we are gaining more traction with larger enterprises. We are at what we feel is an optimal size, and are feeling cautiously optimistic about 2022.

The State of F-Root - Ray Bellis, Director of DNS Operations

Despite the Covid-19 pandemic lasting far longer than anyone expected, 2021 was a good year for F-Root, especially since node deployment depends on people actually being physically present in data centers to rack up and connect the hardware. We deployed F-single nodes at nine new locations, and upgraded “classic” installations to F-single configuration at a further eight locations.

As of the end of 2021, F-Root consists of:

  • 3 “global” sites (at the end of 2020, there were 3)
  • 58 “F-single” sites (2020: 42)
  • 8 “classic” sites (2020: 16)
  • 215+ additional nodes hosted by Cloudflare

The global sites host 2x F-Root servers as well as F-Root management infrastructure. An F-single is our current base configuration, which relies on a single 1U server to provide both the F-Root service and BGP Anycast. A classic site comprises 2x F-Root servers, a console server, routers, and switches. The classic sites are all expected to be phased out and upgraded to the F-single configuration by the end of 2022 and we have a strong pipeline of new installations and upgrades due too.

(To see a list of all the current F-Root nodes, visit and select F from the Root Servers list.)

Our provisioning systems continue to evolve, with lots of effort going into ensuring the consistency of deployments and to improve our monitoring capabilities: Developing improvements to our system monitoring will continue to be the main focus during 2022 (aside from actual node deployments).

Site Changes Completed in 2021

New Sites

Code Location Sponsor
ABQ1 Albuquerque, NM US NMIX
AGP1 Malaga, ES Startnix
CCU1 Kolkata, IN IIFON
DEN2 Denver, CO, US Peaktera
PAH1 Paducah, KY, US PIE
RIC1 Richmond, VA, US Ninja-IX
SCL2 Santiago, CL PIT
TAS1 Tashkent, UZ SNS-IX

Upgraded Sites

Code Location Sponsor
AKL1 Auckland, NZ InternetNZ
FRA1 Frankfurt, DE DE-CIX
GRU1 São Paolo, BR NIC.BR
LIS1 Lisbon, PT DNS PT
PRG1 Prague, CZ ISC /
SCL1 Santiago, CL NIC.CL
TPE1 Taipei, TW CWT

BIND 9 - Ondřej Surý, Director of DNS Engineering

Even with the pandemic raging outside, 2021 was a productive year for the BIND 9 team. Notably, we stabilized BIND 9.16 to a point that it has been designated as an Extended Support Version (ESV).

At the beginning of 2021, Petr Špaček joined the BIND 9 team and began improving our recursive performance testing. Later in the year, Aram Sargsyan jumped right into the fray, working on OpenSSL improvements. In another major personal achievement, Mark Andrews hit 20 years at the company, and he has been named Distinguished Engineer to reflect his long-time commitment to BIND 9.

Release Schedule

At the beginning of 2021, we decided to modify our BIND release model again, to lengthen the time between major branches and provide extended support for every stable branch. You can find out more in our blog post on the topic. This leaves us with a 4-year support cycle for each Stable/ESV release and a 2-year overlap to allow a graceful migration period for our users.

We have reduced the changes backported to the BIND 9.11 branch to a bare minimum, keeping the promise that only security and high-impact issues will be fixed in BIND 9.11 as it nears end-of-life. Code changes in BIND 9.16 were unfortunately greater in the first half of 2021, but since we marked BIND 9.16 as ESV in mid-year, we are gradually reducing the amount of work backported from the development branch to BIND 9.16.

BIND 9.16

The BIND 9.16 network manager code was stabilized in the first half of 2021 to the point where it is stable and reliable. The TCP-handling parts of the network manager code had to be rewritten from scratch, but while this was a difficult choice to make during a stable cycle, it has proved to be reliable since that code was merged.


BIND 9.16 authoritative performance was already in the “good enough” ballpark, achieving around 1Mqps; during the year, we significantly improved the recursive performance testing, building on Petr’s experience. The new recursive testing framework allowed us to identify and fix bottlenecks in the existing code, which reduced the number of threads by one-third by moving internal tasks to run in the network manager worker loops. This at least doubles BIND 9.16’s performance compared to BIND 9.11. We published this blog post where recursive performance is discussed in more detail: We continued to work in this area, refactoring the dispatch (DNS client) code in the upcoming BIND 9.18 release, bringing even higher performance to the recursive function of BIND 9 while reducing memory consumption at the same time.


In BIND 9.18, the BIND 9 native memory allocator was removed and replaced by jemalloc, which could be optionally compiled in and is recommended for all workloads. BIND 9.18 uses the same or less memory than BIND 9.11 while the performance more than doubled.

Users upgrading from 9.11 to 9.16 reported significantly higher memory usage. We fixed this by backporting some of the improvements made for 9.18 to 9.16. This is discussed in length in this KB article:


The upcoming BIND 9.18 will include support for DoT (DNS over TLS), XoT (XFR over TLS), and DoH (DNS over HTTPS), protocols that add encryption-layer support for the new privacy-focused protocols. This is important for users who want to enhance the privacy of their client-resolver connections without relying on the “big tech” providers. We will continue our work in this area, so BIND 9 will keep being a great choice for people who want additional privacy.

Protocol Engineering

ISC’s engineers participate in IETF protocol development. We have collaborated with NLNetLabs on interoperability changes to DNS Cookies - both writing a standard RFC and implementing the new SipHash-based algorithm for DNS Cookies. We continued to collaborate on the new iteration of Catalog Zones that should make all the open source versions interoperable, allowing for more diversity in the secondary servers. BIND 9 now includes support for HTTPSRV records, finally solving the long-standing “CNAME-flattening/ANAME” problem.


The BIND Administrative Reference Manual (ARM) has been converted from DocBook (XML-based) to Sphinx (RST-based) and is now regularly published at

Inclusive Language

The BIND source code, documentation, and configuration options have been changed to follow RFC 8499, DNS Terminology, and to stop using terminology that is considered offensive. The new language is the default in the configuration but the old configuration syntax still works, to prevent breakage of existing deployments. The main git branch is now called main.


In 2021, BIND 9.11 had four CVEs and BIND 9.16 had five CVEs. Details can be found in the BIND 9 Security Vulnerability Matrix in our Knowledgebase.

During investigation of a GSS-TSIG vulnerability in the BIND 9 implementation of SPNEGO, BIND 9 engineers found (and reported, of course) a serious vulnerability of the Heimdal Kerberos implementation used in FreeBSD and other BSDs.

Performance Impacts from Zone Transfers

After at least one customer reported performance degradation during zone transfers when deploying BIND 9.16, we analyzed the code and implemented a new approach to these transfers. Previously, BIND 9 used a technique where it would “quantize” long-running jobs into smaller chunks and intermingle this small-chunk processing into regular query-response processing. Under the new approach, long-running jobs are offloaded to a separate thread pool that runs the jobs independently, leaving scheduling to the operating system kernel. Instead of quantizing the job into arbitrarily sized chunks, the long-running job blocks the other threads for the least possible time - locking and unlocking the shared resources only for a short period of time.

Build System

The build system used by BIND 9 has been completely rewritten to use autoconf, automake, and libtool, making it more modern and easier to understand and modify.


Support for building BIND 9 on Windows has been removed in the development release; the last major release supporting Windows is 9.16.


During the development cycle, it became clear that supporting different implementations of PKCS#11 natively in BIND was inefficient and expensive. Therefore, we contracted with an external party to improve the libp11-based engine_pkcs11 for OpenSSL. This has been done: performance and stability were improved to the point where we were able to drop BIND’s native PKCS#11 implementation in favor of the OpenSSL-based PKCS#11 implemented in engine_pkcs11. In 2022, we plan to implement the PKCS#11 engine for OpenSSL 1.x and the PKCS#11 driver for OpenSSL 3.x, without using libp11.

Future Development

In 2022 we plan to continue fixing bugs, adding new features requested by users and customers, and refactoring old code. A major project planned for the next development cycle is the refactoring of the venerable red-black tree database (RBTDB) implementation used to store authoritative zone records and cached RRsets.

BIND 9 Quality Assurance - Michał Kępień, BIND QA Manager

We recently published an interview with the BIND QA Manager.

  • QA has implemented a unified monthly release cycle for both security and normal patch releases, bringing more predictability and stability to the release process.
  • Continuous Integration now runs completely in the GitLab CI, and we no longer use Jenkins nor even the older “Robie.” All their functions were either moved to the GitLab CI or the need for them has been eliminated.
  • The QA team designed and implemented a completely new recursive performance testing framework which provides much-needed data for making data-based decisions. This new framework nicely complements our existing authoritative performance testing in perflab.

Kea DHCP, ISC DHCP, and Stork - Tomek Mrugalski, Director of DHCP Engineering

Despite all the craziness in the world and in the personal lives of some team members, 2021 was a very good year for the project. We managed to release Kea 2.0.0, which was a major milestone in the project history. Bumping the major number to 2 (we’ve been releasing 1.x since 2015) reflects the overall feeling that the code base has matured significantly and is usable even in the largest and most demanding ISP deployments.

Growing User Base

This confidence is backed up by the growing number of existing and new users. We ended 2021 with 51 Kea support customers, and during the year we closed 521 engineering tickets, including new features, bug fixes, documentation improvements, and more. We shipped 12 releases, several code drops, and quite a few patches to customers who couldn’t wait for the next monthly release. We’re also seeing more support customers who are not ISPs; the expansion into enterprise and university markets is both exciting and scary. The trend is also visible in the new features being requested and implemented.

HA+MT and Performance

Kea is now fully multi-threaded, including the tricky High Availability scenario with two servers communicating over multiple connections and multiple threads. Being able to process lease updates in parallel (with the bottlenecks of a shared single UNIX socket and single TCP connection eliminated) really gave impressive results. In the most extreme scenarios, Kea performance improved tenfold over prior versions. More typical scenarios are less dramatic, but Kea 2.0 is still several times more performant than Kea 1.8. In the most efficient scenario, Kea is able to assign 38K new leases per second; we’re approaching levels where our testing tools are not able to keep up. It’s a good problem to have.


We completed a major sponsored development project: GSS-TSIG. This was by far the biggest custom feature in the history of Kea. GSS-TSIG provides integration with Microsoft Windows environments, using Active Directory that in turn uses Kerberos. The team worked closely with the customer and provided many engineering checkpoints, so the customer could oversee the technical details and perform early integration.


For much of its early life Kea was focused on delivering protocol features, but since it is more or less complete in this regard, our development efforts now shift towards improving management. This is of vital interest for many existing and prospective users. Kea’s REST API interface can now be protected with TLS, including the mutual mode where both server and connecting client certificates are validated. We also developed support for MySQL connections over TLS, and there’s a new section in the Kea ARM about security.

2021 was the second year in a row when we did not publish any security advisories for Kea. However, our internal lodge of scoffers fears that due to the new TLS and Kerberos code in Kea, our good fortune with security incidents may come to an end. Time will tell!

Quality Assurance

We migrated our automated Kea build and testing farm to Amazon Web Services (AWS), and took this opportunity to review and significantly update our testing procedures. Previously, we had a fixed number of virtual machines (VMs) that were always on. With AWS, we migrated to an on-demand mode, where the VMs are created to run a specific set of tests and then are destroyed afterward. This allows us to run tests on more systems. At the end of the year, we had 3789 system tests, running tests on 14 operating systems (various versions of Alpine, CentOS, Debian, Fedora, FreeBSD, and Ubuntu). With over 8,400 unit-tests in Kea code, that gives us over 118,000 test/OS combinations that are being run on every commit to master.

The Kea sources are now 1,008,159 LOC (that’s over a million lines of code). That code is now scrutinized using multiple automated tools, including but not limited to Coverity Scan, TSAN (thread sanitizer), ASAN (address sanitizer), UBSAN (Undefined Behavior Sanitizer), gcov (coverage report), and more. We also run extensive performance tests that check a variety of simple and complex scenarios, including simulating millions of DHCP clients, thousands of subnets, millions of reservations, and more. We now provide native packages for many OSes that greatly simplify the installation effort.


2021 was also a good year for Stork. The team put out nine releases in total, including 1.0 in December. While the project is still miniscule compared to Kea, the user base is growing rapidly, reporting bugs and requesting new features. The project has gotten many new features: TLS support; lease inspection; a configuration review module (Stork can now make suggestions about items to improve in Kea configs); better Prometheus and Grafana integration with new statistics; a full configuration viewer for Kea; a service configuration dump tool with the ability to get all the debugging information typically needed by ISC’s support team, such as config files, log files, a database dump, the OS/Kea/Stork versions, etc., in one tarball; and many more. We now have a more-or-less complete dashboard for Kea and are now shifting towards making Stork capable of configuring Kea.

Stork now has a bit over 123,000 lines of code. The team closed 161 GitLab issues in 2021.


Unfortunately, 2021 was not a productive year for ISC DHCP. With our DHCP engineering resources fully dedicated to general Kea work, GSS-TSIG, and rapidly increasing user requests for Stork, we decided to focus on these newer projects rather than the legacy ISC DHCP. Nevertheless, we’re now getting ready to release ISC DHCP 4.4.3, which will be the last release with both the client and relay components. While the release will be finished in 2022, much of the preparation for this updated release was done in late 2021.

Support - Chuck Stearns, Director of Technical Support

We ended the year with just under 150 customers, including 17 that were new for 2021, and after losing only six customers in 2021. Over 90% of our 2020 support customers renewed their agreements with us.

The support team changed significantly in 2021, with a new manager and a doubling of the number of support engineers, from three to six.

Here is a sample of the things the support team accomplished in 2021:

  • We reduced the median age of active support tickets by 78% in the second half of the year.
  • We revamped our Configuration Review process to make it more timely and manageable.
  • We increased our use of Zoom for customer meetings, instead of relying nearly exclusively on email.
  • The support team attended Kea training.
  • The team managed five CVE/ASN cycles and four Operational Notifications.
  • The team handled 440 support tickets.
  • In the last six months of 2021, we had 231,354 views of our Knowledgebase at, with 83,438 reads.
  • We published 33 new KB articles and updated more than 150 articles. We added SEO text to all of the articles to improve their find-ability via the Internet.

Here are some things we’re looking to accomplish in 2022:

  • We’ve begun the process of migrating to a new support ticketing system (Salesforce).
  • We plan to perform a review of our support processes, specifically the Advance Security Notification, software delivery, and customer/account maintenance processes.
  • We hope to improve our knowledge management, specifically via better maintenance of the KB and software administrators’ manuals.

Other ISC Activities

Policy Development - Rob Carolina, General Counsel

F-Root Operations and RSO Governance

ISC’s status as a root service operator (RSO) spawned some significant work related to the ongoing discussions of a new root server system governance structure (RSS GS). In mid-2021, the community of 12 RSOs began to review and discuss a draft proposal for a new RSS GS put forward by the Root Server System Governance Working Group (RSS GWG), chartered by ICANN.

This resulted in the adoption and publication on 17 November 2021 of “RSSAC058: Success Criteria for RSS Governance Structure” and “RSSAC059: RSSAC Advisory on Success Criteria for the Root Server System Governance Structure.” These documents were warmly received by the ICANN Board of Directors and they will now form part of a revised RSS GWG work plan.

Public Policy

The European Union Proposal for a new NIS2 Directive became a significant focus for ISC in March 2021. NIS2 (a proposed law building on the original NIS Directive to strengthen European approaches to cyber security) was drafted in a manner that appeared to call for EU member states to regulate the cyber security arrangements of all 12 global RSOs. While ISC applauds the desire to strengthen cyber defenses, ISC submitted public comments on the proposed Directive specifically calling out the danger of any sovereign state attempting to directly regulate the world’s root server system (RSS). We pointed out that, far from enhancing the resilience and security of the Internet, sovereign intervention in RSS operations could destabilize the RSS and DNS. We explained that regulatory intervention in the RSS by one sovereign state could prompt (potentially conflicting) regulatory intervention by other sovereign states. We suggested that this would, in turn, risk fragmenting the Internet as we know it. Some of our fellow RSOs made similar observations. The European Parliament subsequently amended the draft Directive in late 2021 to take root servers out of its scope, but the matter is not finally resolved. We now wait to see whether the European Commission will attempt to negotiate the reintroduction of the RSS into the law.

ISC joined the, the patent non-aggression community.

Webinars, Talks, and Blogs

  • We held and recorded nine technical webinars, providing ongoing training to our users. In addition to posting the recordings on ISC’s YouTube channel, we also created a BrightTalk channel to promote our recordings to a wider audience.

  • ISC staff gave six conference talks, archived on the ISC website at This is fewer than in prior years, because - of course - the pandemic has ruined everything.

  • We posted 27 ISC blogs. We published the 2020 Annual Report and updated and re-published the ISC timeline.

  • We launched the ISC swag store, using Shopify and Printful to sell and create some fun ISC-branded items.

  • ISC donated to several non-profit NOGs, as well as to Kea conservation in New Zealand, showing our support for some important organizations.


In the past, some years we have simply been unable to keep up with the number of externally created issues. In 2021, we did some impressive catching-up on that front.

We don’t always fix the issues reported, if the software version is old or if we disagree with the user’s interpretation, or if the reward doesn’t seem worth the effort. Last year though, we fixed more than 80 issues reported by open source users through our GitLab.

We are especially grateful to reporters who:

  • Submit issue reports for problems that exist in currently supported software versions
  • Test the development branch so we can find and fix issues before they end up in a stable version
  • Include logs, crash dumps, and relevant configuration
  • Answer followup questions from the developers attempting to root cause the issue
  • Verify the fixes we produce
  • Provide a patch or suggest a fix

Here are some of these technical contributors from the user community whose reports improved BIND in 2021:

  • Adrien BERNARD - reported a bug
  • Alexander Sulfrian - reported a regression in check-names
  • Anand Buddhdev - pointed out a documentation error
  • Andrej Podzimek - found a bug in RNDC 9.17.16
  • Andrey Blokhintsev - reported an issue with AXFR under FreeBSD and validated the fix for us
  • Andrey Blokhintsev and (several others) - reported an assertion failure which was published as CVE-2021-25218
  • Benjamin Gentil - reported a deadlock in rndc in 9.11
  • Bhargava Shastry - poked us to use Google’s OSS-fuzz program
  • Carl Byington - found a bug in versions 9.16.13, 9.16.13-S1, 9.16.14, 9.16.14-S1, 9.17.11, and 9.17.12
  • Cesar Kuroiwa - provided extensive help in reproducing a crash in XFR over TLS
  • Chris Caputo - tested our libuv integration in the development branch and proposed a logging change
  • Chris Malton - submitted an excellent bug report on IDN support, which led to a fix with help from Tim Rühsen from libidn2
  • Damir Islamov - encountered a problem when upgrading and provided all the information we needed to find and fix it
  • Daniel Stirnimann - found several bugs in the KASP feature, did repeated testing, and validated fixes. Daniel also pinpointed a performance issue with DNSSEC-verify, and in general is a very helpful DNSSEC tester
  • David Ford - reported a compile issue
  • David M Walker - reported a build failure that was fixed
  • Egbert - found a bug in 9.16.15
  • Erich Eckner - reported an issue with AXFR in 9.16.12
  • Flindeberg - submitted a memorable enhancement request, although we opted not to act on it
  • Friedlho - reported a dig crash
  • Greg Rabil - uncovered an issue with static linking and OpenSSL
  • Hakan Gustafsson - reported an issue with updating signed zones
  • Håvard Eidnes - reported some “impossible” statistics and along with Cathal Mooney tracked the issue for quite a while until it was finally fixed.
  • Jean-Christophe Manciot - reported a journal bug that we fixed in the April releases
  • Jean-Christophe Manciot & Vladimir B. Vinogradov- identified a permissions issue causing their installs to fail
  • Jim Pirzyk - reported a bug in dig
  • Jim Popovitch - identified some packet fragmentation issues
  • Jim Westfall - created a confidential issue around memory locking, fixed in early 2021
  • Jinmei Tatuya - contributed a patch to make the BIND plug-in function asynchronous
  • John Heasley - went above and beyond reporting a complex bug with a lot of followup
  • John Perone - found a bug in the 9.17 development branch
  • John W. O’Brien - pointed out a documentation bug in auto-dnssec
  • Josh Soref - reported a documentation bug, probably introduced when we re-formatted for RST
  • JP Mens - reported a usability issue we addressed (and a couple we didn’t)
  • Klaus Darilion - created a confidential issue with AXFR in 9.16.2
  • Kris Karas - found and verified the fix for a deadlock in 9.16.18 and sparked a discussion about integrating NSEC3 into dnssec-policy
  • Laurent Frigault - submitted a crash dump with all the information we needed to find and fix it
  • Laurent Gouhier - reported a performance loss in 9.16
  • Legacy1 - reported a Windows issue, which Richard Neal reproduced it for us
  • LM Jogbäck - found an issue with DNSSEC policy
  • Lusia Kundel - submitted a typo fix in nsupdate help
  • Marc Dequènes (Duck) - reported several issues with dnssec-policy and tested the fixes (Quack!)
  • Mathieu Arnold - reported an issue that was first logged with FreeBSD. Several other BSD users chimed in, including Xin Li and Dimitry Andric, until John W. O’Brien confirmed that the issue had been fixed in a later release
  • Michael Osipov - reported a bug in a test, which was fixed, then found yet another problem with Kerberos linking, and also found an issue with nsupdate
  • Michel Lespinasse - reported an issue with DNSSEC key rotation with multiple views
  • Ole Bjørn Hessen - reported that BIND 9.16.8 does not honor CPU affinity
  • Oskar Stenman - noticed that “masters” were not renamed to “primaries” in CATZ
  • Patrick McLean - submitted a patch to improve dig’s timestamp accuracy
  • Pdw-mb - found a documentation error
  • Per Lundberg - added to an existing bug report instead of creating a new one (thank you for this!)
  • Petr Menšík of RedHat - made many contributions throughout the year, including several merge requests
  • Phil Regnauld - pointed out a typo in the DNSSEC Guide
  • Piolink-kycho - found a memory leak during stress testing
  • Rainer W. - provided a bug report with suggested fixes
  • Ralf Jung - reported an issue with in-line signing, confirmed by Jean-Christophe Manciot
  • Richard Laager - found an interoperability issue we ended up deciding not to add a workaround for, but which we appreciated
  • Roland Illig - took the time to report a minor documentation typo
  • Rosen Penev - submitted a patch
  • Sara Dickinson - helped in testing and specifying requirements for XoT
  • Sean Zhang - found and correctly diagnosed the infamous issue with the missing “w” that resulted in security fixes across all supported versions in June
  • Stacey Marshall - reported a Solaris configuration issue
  • Stanislav Levin - found a problem with the cache for managed keys in 9.16
  • Stuart Henderson - reported an obscure test issue with OpenBSD and Raspbian
  • Sven Strickroth - suggested an additional log message to improve usability
  • Thomas Amgarten - found a tricky issue with journal files
  • Thomas Amgarten - helped us with KASP troubleshooting
  • Timothe Litt - highlighted the use of http references in the documentation
  • Tobias Günther - prompted us to update Launchpad for new Ubuntu versions
  • Triatic - tested BIND’s DoH implementation vs Windows
  • Vsevolod Volkov - observed a memory leak on FreeBSD and verified the fix for us
  • Wil Knoll - reported a bug in QNAME minimization

We also offer our thanks to:

  • Our stalwart ISC DHCP community experts, Simon Hobson, Sten Carlsen, Bill Shirley, Bob Harold, Niall O’Reilly, Glen Satchell, and Gregory Sloop, who are helping a whole new generation of users with their ISC DHCP issues via the dhcp-users mailing list.

  • Numerous other BIND users, Kea users, and ISC DHCP users, who provided expert advice to others on our user mailing lists. ISC staff could not possibly answer all these questions ourselves, not only because of the number of questions, but because we don’t have the depth and variety of operational experience our users have. We are grateful for these contributions of technical expertise.

  • The many sponsors of our F-root nodes. They donate rackspace, purchase servers, help support our operating costs and generally make it possible to provide free root services to the Internet.

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