[DNSSEC] BIND validates but not Unbound: who is right?

[Mukund Sivaraman]

On Mon, Feb 16, 2015 at 11:26:00PM +0530, Mukund Sivaraman wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 16, 2015 at 11:19:51PM +0530, Mukund Sivaraman wrote:
> > But while RFC 4509 sec. 6 talks about this issue in the case of DS with
> > SHA-2 algorithms, there is no requirement there.
> 
> There is this nugget here:
> 
> > Implementations MUST support the use of the SHA-256 algorithm in DS
> > RRs.  Validator implementations SHOULD ignore DS RRs containing SHA-1
> > digests if DS RRs with SHA-256 digests are present in the DS RRset.
> 
> Perhaps this is why Unbound fails validation.
> 
> We should discuss this in the BIND context. Immediately upon reading
> this, I thought this probably means "SHOULD ignore authentication chains
> through SHA-1 if an authentication chain through SHA-256 exists." But
> that invites downgrade attacks.

UGH that's the DS digest, not algorithm. This is no bug in BIND. I'm
sorry.

		Mukund
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