changing NSEC3 salt

[Timothe Litt]

On 06-Feb-14 09:14, Klaus Darilion wrote:
>
>
> On 06.02.2014 14:58, Cathy Almond wrote:
>> On 06/02/2014 12:58, Timothe Litt wrote:
>>> On 06-Feb-14 05:56, Cathy Almond wrote:
>>>> On 05/02/2014 18:54, David Newman wrote:
>>>>> The Michael W. Lucas DNSSEC book recommends changing NSEC3 salt every
>>>>> time a zone's ZSK changes.
>>>>>
>>>>> Is this just a matter of a new 'rndc signing' command, or is some 
>>>>> action
>>>>> needed to remove the old salt?
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks
>>>>>
>>>>> dn
>>>> rndc signing -nsec3param ...
>>>>
>>>> I would expect the old NSEC3 chain and old NSEC3PARAM record to be
>>>> removed, once the new chain is in place.
>>>>
>>>> (Similarly, the new NSEC3PARAM record will not appear in the zone 
>>>> until
>>>> the new NSEC3 chain has been completely generated).
>>>>
>>>> Cathy
>>>>
>>> This seems silly.  Why should a person have to select a salt at all?
>>> It's just a random number, and people are really bad at picking random
>>> numbers.  Seems like a miss in 'DNSSEC for humans' :-)
>>>
>>> There should be a mechanism to tell named to pick a random number and
>>> use it for the salt.  (I suggest '*' - '-' already means 'none'.)  
>>> named
>>> already has to know how to get random numbers, so this should not be
>>> difficult.  It should work for records supplied in UPDATE transactions
>>> as well as rndc signing.
>>>
>>> A bit more work to have it function when loaded from a zone file, 
>>> though
>>> that doesn't seem unreasonable.  (E.g. if read from a zone file, pick a
>>> salt, treat the record as if loaded with that value, and do all the
>>> requisite (re-)signing.)
>>>
>>> I'm copying bind9-bugs so this doesn't get lost.  Please don't copy 
>>> that
>>> list if you comment on this. (Careful with that 'reply all'!)
>>>
>>> Timothe Litt
>>> ACM Distinguished Engineer
>>
>> Sounds like a good idea - thanks.
>
> Indeed. It would also solve the theoretical problem of NSEC3 hash 
> collisions (see my email from 3. Feb 2014)
>
> regards
> Klaus
>
>
Not quite.  It would enable a solution, but it doesn't solve it unless 
named also checks for a collision, picking a new salt and re-trying in 
that case.  That would be a good idea (though creating a test case would 
be a good student challenge).  [If it isn't tested, it doesn't work...]

Note also the RFC 5155 recommendation:
> The salt SHOULD be at least 64 bits long and unpredictable, so that
> an attacker cannot anticipate the value of the salt and compute the
> next set of dictionaries before the zone is published.
In case it wasn't obvious, I should have noted that the length would be 
a config file entry.


Timothe Litt
ACM Distinguished Engineer
--------------------------
This communication may not represent the ACM or my employer's views,
if any, on the matters discussed.

This communication may not represent my employer's views,
if any, on the matters discussed.

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