Multiple masters and multiple TSIG keys

[Anand Buddhdev]

On 29/09/2010 12:09, Niall O'Reilly wrote:

> On 29 Sep 2010, at 09:34, Anand Buddhdev wrote:
> 
>> Now, I have been given 2 keys, t1 and t2, to use for transferring z1 and
>> z2 respectively.
> 
> 	[Wandering off topic, perhaps]
> 
> 	That seems to me a back-to-front way to do things.
> 
> 	If the organization running the master is concerned to identify
> 	responsibility for purported slave access, the key needs to be
> 	provided by the organization responsible for running the slave,
> 	and accepted (or not) at the master end.
> 
> 	That's what I expect from my slaves.
> 	None has revolted yet. 8-)
> 
> 	One way or the other, using multiple keys to express what is
> 	intrinsically a single trust relationship seems to be both likely
> 	to increase the risk of compromise and certain to add administrative
> 	burden.  Why do it?

Hi Niall,

You're probably right, and it does increase administrative burden.
However, this design isn't my choice, so I'm stuck with it.

Anyway, I discussed this with my colleague here, and we came up with a
solution that works. We have created 2 views of the master name servers:

masters m-key1 {ip1 key key1; ... };
masters m-key2 {ip1 key key2; ... };

zone z1 {
	masters { m-key1; };
	...
};

zone z2 {
	masters { m-key2; };
	...
};

Regards,

Anand Buddhdev