Not sure if my DNS is vulnerable?

Ben Croswell ben.croswell at gmail.com
Wed Aug 13 15:52:38 UTC 2008


I have not heard of any actual javascript attacks like I mentioned in the
wild, but it is a definite possibility.

On Wed, Aug 13, 2008 at 11:01 AM, John Smith <n6s7a6 at gmail.com> wrote:

> Do you have any links to the reports I would like to read them... I could
> not find them using Google?
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 13, 2008 at 10:52 AM, Faehl, Chris <cfaehl at rightnow.com>wrote:
>
>> John,
>>
>> Yes, there have been successful attacks. As you might expect, many of the
>> targets are financial institutions.
>>
>> Chris Faehl
>> Hosting Manager, RightNow Technologies
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: bind-users-bounce at isc.org [mailto:bind-users-bounce at isc.org] On
>> Behalf Of John Smith
>> Sent: Wednesday, August 13, 2008 8:29 AM
>> To: Chris Buxton
>> Cc: Ben Croswell; bind-users at isc.org
>> Subject: Re: Not sure if my DNS is vulnerable?
>>
>> Has anyone heard of any successful attacks?
>> On Wed, Aug 13, 2008 at 10:27 AM, John Smith <n6s7a6 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> > That clears it up for me. Thank you.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Wed, Aug 13, 2008 at 10:12 AM, Chris Buxton <cbuxton at menandmice.com
>> >wrote:
>> >
>> >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>> >> Hash: SHA1
>> >>
>> >> No, that's pretty much it.
>> >>
>> >> Step 1) Attacker sets up attacking name server, which waits for contact
>> >> from a potential victim.
>> >>
>> >> Step 2) Attacker hacks a web page, adding a short (and
>> legitimate-looking)
>> >> JavaScript.
>> >>
>> >> Step 3) Innocent web browser in your organization visits the web page,
>> >> loading the attack script.
>> >>
>> >> Step 4) The script tries to load an image from the attacker's domain.
>> This
>> >> tells the attacking name server your source port for queries, can
>> encode the
>> >> target domain to be spoofed, and triggers the attack. During the
>> attack, the
>> >> JavaScript is trying to load images from successive domains in the same
>> zone
>> >> as the target domain to be spoofed, on a schedule. The attacking name
>> server
>> >> is trying to spoof each of these nearby names, on the same schedule, by
>> >> brute-forcing the transaction ID. (It's only 16 bits long - that's not
>> much
>> >> of a crypto key.) The script can load more images from the attacker's
>> >> domain, thus informing the attacking name server of its progress and
>> getting
>> >> status reports back.
>> >>
>> >> The whole attack is completely automated, is triggered by a trusted
>> user's
>> >> web browser, will penetrate firewalls in nearly all cases (but an IPS
>> may be
>> >> able to stop it - by disabling inbound responses to your resolving name
>> >> server, rendering it useless), and is fast and deadly.
>> >>
>> >> Chris Buxton
>> >> Professional Services
>> >> Men & Mice
>> >>
>> >> On Aug 13, 2008, at 6:56 AM, Ben Croswell wrote:
>> >>
>> >>  I would say you are "less vulnerable", but you are still vulnerable.
>> >>> It is only a matter of time before someone integrates the exploit code
>> >>> into
>> >>> a webpage.
>> >>> One of your internal users goes to the web page which has the browser
>> >>> resolve somehost.evil.org.  The attacker now knows the IP of your
>> >>> outbound
>> >>> DNS server.  At this point  I would guess, it wouldn't to difficult to
>> >>> have
>> >>> javascript on the webpage force the browser to do the actual DNS
>> queries
>> >>> from the inside.  Once those go out the attacker spams the answer back
>> to
>> >>> win the race.
>> >>>
>> >>> Anyone else can correct me if I am too far off base.
>> >>>
>> >>> --
>> >>> -Ben Croswell
>> >>>
>> >>> On Wed, Aug 13, 2008 at 9:15 AM, John Smith <n6s7a6 at gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>  So I have a caching only DNS server that is behind a firewall and has
>> no
>> >>>> incoming connections allowed unless specifically requested from
>> inside.
>> >>>> My
>> >>>> DNS server does contact the root DNS servers upstream. But again
>> >>>> incoming
>> >>>> conections are only allowed into my DNS server unless the originated
>> >>>> from
>> >>>> the inside.
>> >>>> As far as I understand the problem for the recent DNS issues is from
>> >>>> someone
>> >>>> on the outside of my firewall ( I am ignoring an attack from the
>> inside)
>> >>>> would have to send my DNS server (which they cannot) some DNS
>> requests
>> >>>> in
>> >>>> order to get a reply for them to attack?
>> >>>> Am I right? so since I do not have external access to port 53 I am
>> >>>> relatively safe?
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Since my DNS is not randomizing ports but is radomizign transaction
>> >>>> id's?
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Just curious.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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>> >> iEYEARECAAYFAkii6+cACgkQ0p/8Jp6Boi2vwgCgrKvtDF328VuRHml3lavIgOiu
>> >> 0J8An1bEBeeQ6pCVyXu7vzND68WvQ/VB
>> >> =Otxk
>> >> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>>
>


-- 
-Ben Croswell




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